The aim of this article is to identify the main principles governing the interpretation of domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration and to analyse the meaning of such provisions in the context of the SPP v. Egypt case as the first case on the issue. The article first examines the peculiarities of consent to ICSID jurisdiction by way of national legislation. In the first part the analysis of the practice of arbitral tribunals in which a claim was introduced on the basis of consent to arbitration in domestic law shows that specific language of national legislation on consent to arbitration varies considerably. Therefore, since consent is the "cornerstone" of the Centre's jurisdiction, arbitral tribunals recognize that not all references to ICSID arbitration in national legislation amount to consent. They approach the task of ascertaining the existence of such consent with great care. In the second part, the article focuses on the SPP v. Egypt case on the issue and analyses challenges that the tribunal met in interpreting relevant national clauses and establishing the consent to arbitration. Finally, this article discusses the legacy of interpretation standard of SPP v. Egypt case in context of the dissenting opinion and further case law. It is argued that the rules of interpretation of domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration are conditioned by the sui generis nature of consent to arbitration as unilateral declarations capable of giving rise to international legal obligations. Therefore, for the purpose of
INTRODUCTION
The state's consent to arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) included in its national legislation is considered one of the standards of protection for investors granted by states in their domestic laws.
Today domestic laws have been largely overtaken by BIT's as the preferential legal mechanism for the protection of foreign investment. However, the possibility to establish consent to arbitration through domestic investment legislation is recognised as one of the possible ways to consent to arbitration under ICSID convention and still some jurisdictions include references to ICSID convention in their respective national investment laws. 1 Taking into account that those national laws raise their own legal issues as far as the consent provided in the domestic laws is considered a unilateral act by the state which can not be interpreted in the same way as investment treaties, it is necessary to examine what the specific ways to interpret such national provisions are.
The practice of arbitral tribunals in which a claim was introduced on the basis of consent to arbitration in domestic law shows that specific language of national legislation on consent to arbitration varies considerably. 2 There is not unified opinion on how such clauses should be interpreted in academic articles too. 3 Since consent is the "cornerstone" of the Centre's jurisdiction, arbitral tribunals recognize that not all references to ICSID arbitration in national legislation amount to consent. They approach the task of ascertaining the existence of such consent with great care.
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Thus, the aim of this article is to identify the main principles governing the interpretation of domestic law clauses that grant jurisdiction to ICSID arbitration provided in academic papers and arbitration as well to analyse the application of such principles in particular in context of the SPP v. Egypt case as the first and leading case on the issue. provisions containing an offer to arbitrate before ICSID.
SCOPE OF CONSENT TO ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION
Consent to ICSID jurisdiction may be given in different ways. One option is as a provision in the host state's national legislation offering ICSID arbitration to foreign investors.
Some national legislation laws contain unequivocal provisions for dispute settlement by ICSID. 5 Some provide reference to ICSID as one of several possible means of dispute settlement. There are also jurisdictions that require a specific agreement between the host state and the investor contained in an investment agreement, an investment license or another document. 6 The most problematic are cases in the so-called "gray area": with national provisions that are less clear and may raise serious doubts whether or not the state has expressed its consent to arbitration. Cases that fall under this "gray area" may include legislation by which the host country's legislator simply informs possible foreign investors that the state is a party to the ICSID convention. There may be national provisions providing that the "foreign investor "shall be entitled to request that the dispute be finally settled by one of several methods including the ICSID The dispute ended with the tribunal's decision in 1992, in which Egypt was held liable to pay equitable compensation for the value of the expropriated investment.
CHALLENGES THE TRIBUNAL HAD TO FACE IN INTERPRETING NATIONAL LAW

APPLICABLE LAW
The first matter with which the tribunal dealt in SPP v. Egypt case was the applicable law to the consent to arbitration provided for in the national legislation.
The tribunal recognised that consent to arbitration should be treated as a unilateral declaration capable of giving rise to an international legal obligation. It decided that the issue in this case was "whether certain unilaterally enacted legislation has created an international obligation under a multilateral treaty".
10
The tribunal decided that the interpretation of the host state of its legislation is to be given considerable weight, but it cannot control the tribunal's decision as to its own competence. Taking into account that Law No. 43 is not the result of negotiations between two or more states, but rather the result of unilateral act by a single state, the tribunal stated that "to the extent that Article 8 is alleged to be a universal declaration of acceptance of the Centre's jurisdiction, subject to reciprocal acceptance by a national of another contracting state, the tribunal must also consider certain aspects of international law governing unilateral juridical acts."
11
The tribunal concluded that the applicable law by which it shall determine whether national statute provided for consent to ICSID jurisdiction would be "general principles of statutory interpretation taking into consideration, where appropriate, relevant rules of treaty interpretations and principles of international law applicable to unilateral declarations".
12
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RULES OF INTERPRETATION PROVIDED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN FINDING CONSENT TO ARBITRATION
The second issue for the tribunal was whether the provision referring to ICSID in national legislation was capable of constituting consent to jurisdiction. Firstly, the tribunal recognized that the starting point in statutory interpretation shall be the ordinary or grammatical meaning of the terms used. Secondly, the tribunal decided that "jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither restrictively nor expansively, but rather objectively and in good faith, and jurisdiction will be found to exist if-but only if-the force of the arguments militating in its favour is preponderant." 13 At this stage, the tribunal concentrated on a detailed grammatical analysis of relevant text, including Arabic original, and tried to find whether the reference to ICSID jurisdiction is formulated in mandatory terms or, on the contrary, subject to a further manifestation of will by the state.
In this respect, the tribunal took into consideration the particular usage of the verb phrase "shall be settled" as opposed to "may be". The tribunal found that the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words "shall be settled" was mandatory on its face, and it was undisputed that the Arabic word from which it was translated meant "shall be/will be". The tribunal relied on the dictum of the ICJ 14 and concluded that such expression mandated the submission of disputes to the various methods prescribed therein (as opposed to making them purely optional and subject to a further consent by the state). 15 Thirdly, the tribunal rejected Egypt's contention that national legislation required the execution of a separate agreement to establish consent to Centre's jurisdiction. In the tribunal's opinion, such a requirement would "destroy the internal logic of art 8 and render much of that provision superfluous". 16 The tribunal also rejected the idea that Article 8 had the consequence only of informing potential investors of Egypt's willingness to negotiate a consent agreement.
Fourthly, with respect to the question of priority among the various methods of dispute settlement, the tribunal found that there was a hierarchical relationship indicated by a movement from the more specific to the more general. Arabic "does not contain the mandatory effect eventually attributed to "shall" in the English language". 20 This led the judge to conclude that "Article 8 does not contain standing offer to submit ipso facto any investment disputes to ICSID arbitration."
21
Judge Dr El Mahdi emphasised that the state's consent to submit itself to the ICSID jurisdiction is not to be presumed and but must be proven. In his opinion, "the claimants did not present evidence to the effect that Egypt consented in a clear unequivocal language to submit the present dispute to the jurisdiction of the Centre". However, the practice of a tribunal still varies in its emphasis on domestic or international law. For example, in the Zhinvali v Georgia case a tribunal found that interpretation of state's consent was primarily governed by the law of Georgia, subject, however, to the control of international law. 25 In the Mobil and CEMEX cases tribunals took the view that when the consent of the State is contained in national law. The interpretation of such a unilateral act is governed by international law, but, in order to interpret the state's intent, domestic laws should also be taken into account. 26 In those cases tribunals put a strong emphasis on the intention of the State making the declaration and stated that 'the intention of the declaring State must prevail'. 27 The tribunals decided that "intention can be deduced from the text, but also from the context, the circumstances of its preparation and the purposes intended to be served". rule that a unilateral declaration "must be interpreted as it stands, having regard to the words actually used". 30 Tribunals also refer to the rule that due consideration should be paid to the intention of the state having formulated such acts, which can be deduced from the "context" of the act, "the circumstances of its preparation"
and the "purposes intended to be served". The Guiding principle 7 emphasizes the importance of textual analysis of unilateral declaration and declares that it "entails obligations for the formulating State only if it is stated in clear and specific terms". 32 The Guiding Principles require that weight be given to the "context and circumstances" in which the unilateral act was formulated and says that it is necessary to take account all the factual circumstances in which the declaration was made and "of the reactions to which they gave rise". It should be noted that the rule of restrictive interpretation has been identified by some academics as a "departure from the approach of the Vienna Convention to interpretation". 35 Therefore, it is contestable whether the rule of restrictive interpretation may be applied to the state's consent to arbitration provided in national legislation. It is necessary to take into consideration not only the state's expression of consent to arbitration, but also "the foreign investor's viewpoint -i.e.
how the foreign investor could understand the consent to arbitration expressed by the host State". 36 The position of the arbitration tribunals on how consent to arbitration should be interpreted: restrictively or expansively also varies. For example, the arbitral tribunal in the SOABI v. Senegal case emphasised the need to take into account investors' legitimate expectations 37 . In the Tradex v. Albania case the tribunal applied the doctrine of effective interpretation or so called extensive interpretation,
recognizing that in the case of doubt national law should rather be interpreted in favour of investor protection and in favour of ICSID jurisdiction. 38 However, most tribunals in recent decisions have applied a balanced approach to the interpretation of consent to arbitration that rejects both a presumption against or in favour of jurisdiction and take "neither broad nor restrictive approach". 39 The same position was admitted in the SPP v. Egypt case as well. 
CONCLUSION
